By JEELAN SYED for the Toronto Globalist
The years 2003 and 2004 were marked by two monumental events from which Georgia and Ukraine date their respective political reorientations westward. Indeed, the Rose and Orange Revolutions presented the European Union (EU) with opportunities that the latter failed to grasp fully. In the context of great political change these revolutions launched a wave of enthusiasm that was quickly to lose its driving spirit.
The revolutions were causes of unity in the EU. All member states believed that these revolutions showed signs of European values and all member states rejected the results of the Ukrainian run-off election in November 2004. However, the events exposed the EU’s
institutional failures and its incapacity to properly deal with its new neighbours. The EU presidency played a secondary role and the troika was not even present. It was the presidents of Lithuania and Poland who initiated round table discussions and contributed to the eventual resolution. These revolutions were also the occasion of a split in Europe between, broadly-speaking, the Eastern and Western European countries. As Taras Kuzio argues, this split is in part due to the Russophilia of “old Europe” (i.e., France, Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg).
The institutional failure in the EU to properly address the revolutionary events is partly due to its tripartite nature. The European Council adopted a conservative stance with respect to the evolution of its relationship with the Ukraine. It favoured closer co-operation but offered no membership perspective. Furthermore, there was no change in the Action Plan – which had been negotiated with outgoing president Kuchma – which is a clear sign of Europe’s lack of response to the momentous event. The European Commission was also very clear that it would follow the Council’s line: a 10-point letter to enrich the Action Plan, written by Solana and Ferrero-Waldner, failed to add much and consisted mainly of reformulations and was essentially cosmetic. The Parliament, by far the most progressive, had alluded to an offer of membership by passing the “Results of the Ukraine Elections” resolution.
Has the EU taken on a new role in the post-revolutionary period? Georgia and Ukraine have demonstrated their European credentials and have made many steps toward creating freer societies. Greater rule of law, anti-corruption campaigns, and renewed and evaluated state budgets have all been created. Moreover, greater transparency has been guaranteed not only by the fact that parliamentary sittings are now broadcast on television, but the media has also been encouraged to scrutinize the government without fear of censorship. The Ukraine has also made significant strides toward WTO membership. Both states, furthermore, have created positions that aim to develop a national strategy for European integration. Thus, it is clear that the Rose and Orange Revolutions were a turning point from nominal westernization to an implementation of reforms and a tangible westward outlook. Both states see themselves as European. Through the European Neighbourhood Policy, however, they continue to be regarded as neighbours of Europe.
The EU has done very little to spur and promote reforms in the Ukraine and in Georgia. It has neither closed nor opened its door to membership. Due to this lack of leadership and initiative, the revolutions have yet to run their full course, with their original destination still to be reached. The leaders of the revolutions, Saakashvili and Yushchenko, have endured very low popularity ratings in recent years and there are still many signs of corruption and anti-democratic behavior. Some analysts argue that the Ukraine is somewhere between a democracy and a failed state, while others point at Saakashvili’s post-bolshevism as direct consequences of the EU’s inaction in fostering democratic change in these two countries. Indeed, the lack of progress can be in part attributed to the EU’s lack of incentive and its weak leadership – how long can the EU expect its neighbours to implement reforms without any reciprocity in terms of accession?
Both Georgia and Ukraine are marked by strong pro-democratic forces that have been aided to a lesser scale by the EU, but mainly by other actors who have tried to secure – through peaceful revolutions – pro-democratic reform-minded governments. The EU has been reluctant to act, in part due to internal division among member states, and also because of institutional failures. This reluctance may not have changed the motivation for Euro-integration, but it has effectively diluted it. Both countries have shown some signs of regression, despite the pro-democratic enthusiasm that marked their respective revolutionary periods. The Colour Revolutions focused European attention eastwards, but without offering Georgia and Ukraine strong enough incentives, the EU has weakened the drive for reform in the latter, thereby effectively taming the revolutionary spirits that once inhabited them. The Ukraine and Georgia strive to be recognized as “European states,” but as long as the EU fails to grant them that full title, the real revolutions will not have done their full 360°.
